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Abstract: The Mental Capacity Act 2005 has put the assessment of  mental capacity for decision-
making at the forefront of  psychiatric practice.  This capacity is commonly linked within 
philosophy to (personal) autonomy, that is, to the idea(l) of  self-government.  However, 
philosophers disagree deeply about what constitutes autonomy.  This contribution brings out 
how the competing conceptions of  autonomy would play out in psychiatric practice, taking 
anorexia nervosa as a test case.  
 
Keywords: mental capacity; autonomy; philosophy; anorexia nervosa; law; ethics; H. Frankfurt 
 
 
 
Within philosophy, the concept of  mental capacity for decision-making (or competence) is 
intimately connected to that of  personal autonomy.  In a nutshell, personal autonomy pertains to 
persons who govern themselves according to their own reasons or desires, where, depending on 
the particular view taken, this might include various emotive states, preferences, values, 
commitments, or character traits.   While not without its critics, personal autonomy is widely 
valued in modern liberal societies and within philosophy.  It is seen as the fundamental good that 
grounds moral and legal rights of  individuals (including the right to refuse treatment), and whose 
violation constitutes (at least in part) the badness of  domination, manipulation, paternalism, and 
slavery.  Without personal autonomy, individuals are said to be at odds with themselves, not 
accountable, and unable to live authentic lives. 
 With so much at stake, it is perhaps unsurprising that there is no consensus among 
philosophers on the specific nature (and value) of  autonomy.  There are at least two deep 
fissures between rival and apparently incompatible ways of  understanding autonomy.   
 The first fundamental disagreement is about whether or not autonomy is value-laden.  
Often accounts of  personal autonomy are value-neutral.  In this case, a person’s own reasons or 
desires need not be moral ones—he or she can be autonomous and non-moral or even immoral.  
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However, there are also accounts which build values or the capacity to appreciate them directly 
into the conception of  personal autonomy, though the values in questions need not be restricted 
to moral ones, but can include prudential values.  
 The second important dividing line within philosophical debates about personal 
autonomy, which partly cuts across the first one, is the issue of  whether and to what extent 
autonomy must be rational.  Thus, conceptions of  autonomy differ as to whether or not the agent 
needs to meet certain requirements of  rationality, and in their understanding of  these 
requirements (formal/procedural versus substantive).   
 This contribution discusses three kinds of  conceptions: (a) value-neutral, non-rational; 
(b) value-neutral, rational (procedural); and (c) value-laden, rational (substantive).  It takes 
anorexia nervosa as a test case for each. 
 
1. Autonomy as reflective endorsement 
One prominent view among the theorists who argue for personal autonomy are higher-order 
accounts inspired by H. Frankfurt’s influential discussion of  freedom of  the will.i  On these 
accounts, we distinguish between first-order desires and second-order desires, that is, between 
wanting something and wanting to want it.  Autonomy is then understood to require second-
order identification with those first-order desires that are effective in moving the will.  
Conversely, one is lacking autonomy if  one's effective first-order desires include wanting to do 
something which one does not want to want to do, such as in the case of  an unwilling addict, 
who desires to take a drug, but does not identify with this desire and would prefer to be without 
it.  Moreover, those who have no second-order desires at all (whom Frankfurt calls ‘wantons’) 
lack autonomy by default—given the structure of  their desires (or rather, the lack of  structure), 
they could not be autonomous.  
 This account of  autonomy conceives of  it neither in moral nor rational terms.  While 
identification might acquire moral relevance—for example, it might suffice for moral 
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responsibility—there is no internal link to morality implied in this structural constraint on an 
agent’s motivational set.  Thus, even someone who identifies with and endorses his or her 
immoral first-order desire counts as autonomous on this model.  Similarly, autonomy does not 
necessarily involve meeting any rationality requirements—the reflective endorsement of  first-
order desires at second-order level can be a wholly non-rational process.  In fact, it need not 
even involve deliberation: second-order identification might be achieved even when the person in 
question did not consciously attend to the matter, but would endorse his or her first-order 
desires if  he or she had attended to them.  
 One advantage of  the Frankfurt-inspired model is that it seems to avoid the metaphysical 
commitments of  many traditional models.  It analyses autonomy (and personhood) in terms of  
something which is metaphysically innocuous, namely, in terms of  a psychological capacity to 
hierarchically structure one’s desires.  By introducing the idea of  a hierarchy of  desires we can 
explain the resolution of  conflicts among first-order desires by appeal to a ‘true self ’, but 
without commitment to a homunculus or transcendental self.  Other advantages are that this 
model need not conceive of  emotions as alien influences, and that it frees autonomy from overly 
evaluative and moralised presuppositions.  For these reasons, this model may seem promising for 
deployment in psychiatric practice.  
 However, there are also problems with this model.  Leaving aside the philosophical 
debates surrounding it, we can see this by considering the test case of  anorexia nervosa.  Persons 
who have anorexia often see it as part of  their personal identity.ii  If  this means that they 
reflectively endorse it, then they would count as autonomous on the Frankfurt-inspired model 
and be entitled to the full legal protection of  their choices.  In fact, even if  the second-order 
identification with the first-order desire to be thin at all costs is shown to have its origin in the 
condition, this would not suffice to discount it as inauthentic on this model.  However, most 
psychiatrists tend to think that anorexia nervosa impedes mental capacity and, in any case, may 
merit compulsory treatment.iii  Hence, this model is in conflict with contemporary psychiatric 
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practice, and one of  the two would have to give way.   
 
2. Autonomy as procedural independence 
One influential alternative adds a constraint to the Frankfurt-inspired model of  personal 
autonomy: if  the process of  identification with first-order desires was affected by autonomy-
undermining influences, then the identification is not counted as conferring autonomy.iv  In this 
way, a rationality constraint of  a procedural nature is included into the conception.  The crucial 
challenge for the proponents of  this alternative model is to identify which influences are 
autonomy-undermining and which are not, and to identify them on the basis of  a procedural 
account alone, without reference to objective reasons or the rationality of  outcomes.  Only if  
this challenge can be successfully met is this model truly value-neutral, which would have the 
advantage of  making autonomy compatible with the entrenched value pluralism of  modern 
liberal societies. 
 However, it is far from obvious that procedural independence suffices to identify all 
intuitively autonomy-undermining influences and conditions.  The standard of  rationality 
employed here is minimal and only concerns the process of  reasoning—beliefs and desires need 
to be in some sort of  coherence and this coherence should not be the result of  factors which 
inhibit or outweigh reasoning processes in a problematic way (with the paradigm examples being 
manipulation by others and lack of  certain cognitive faculties).  Yet, there are some cases in 
which such a minimal, procedural standard of  rationality is met, but we would still not want to 
call the person autonomous, or attest them mental capacity.  Thus, there may be some patients 
who, while otherwise in possession of  their cognitive abilities, have a set of  delusional or false 
beliefs and/or distorted values, but reason as well on the basis of  these beliefs or values as non-
pathological persons do (and also achieve similar or higher levels of  coherence).  In fact, it has 
been shown that anorexia patients often display neither below-average defects in cognitive ability, 
nor a lack of  coherence—just the opposite: many have hierarchically organised value systems 
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and perform well in terms of  reasoning, understanding, and expressing their choices.v  On the 
procedural rationality model these patients would again count as autonomous and, hence, be 
granted the full legal right of  self-determination. Yet, this seems counterintuitive and, as seen, 
contravenes psychiatric practice.  
 
3. Autonomy as responsiveness to reasons 
Considerations such as these might motivate the turn to yet a third model of  personal autonomy, 
according to which we need to add a different sort of  criterion: responsiveness to ‘objective 
reasons’.  Such reasons might be of  a cognitive nature, so that responsiveness to them implies 
that one is not completely ignorant or has no manifestly false and delusional beliefs;vi or these 
reasons can (also) involve orientation by and appreciation of  values.vii  If  so, then personal 
autonomy gains an inherently value-laden, sometimes even moral, dimension.  Thus, Meyers, 
among others, claims that the conduct of  the agent needs to be within the bounds of  the morally 
permissible to count as (genuinely) autonomous.viii  Kant and Kantians go further still: for them 
autonomy amounts to agents self-legislating the moral law and acting out of  respect for it.ix 
 On the third model, patients with anorexia nervosa would most likely not be counted as 
autonomous, for they often have false beliefs about how thin they are; their paramount regard 
for thinness would be faulted for showing insufficient appreciation of  the value of  their health, 
life, and relationships; and they could be seen as treating their own agency as a means to a non-
moral end that endangers their moral agency.  Hence, they would be judged to lack mental 
capacity or, at any rate, autonomy, and could legitimately be treated for their condition, even 
when they do not consent to such treatment.  
 However, this assessment comes at a cost: adopting this third model of  autonomy would 
mean that psychiatry will not be completely value-neutral or value-free.  Also, difficulties arise 
because there is deep, and arguably, reasonable pluralism about values and the nature of  
substantive rationality within modern societies.  Conceptions of  autonomy which contain a 
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substantive rationality standard will thus face the challenge of  being sufficiently broad to be 
compatible with this pluralism, but also sufficiently fine-grained to be of  use in identifying lack 
of  capacity in psychiatric and legal contexts.  Moreover, such conceptions are in tension with an 
intuition which is widely accepted in modern, liberal societies: most adult human beings are self-
governing their lives to an extent that they should be granted the full right of  self-determination, 
despite the fact that they often do not meet standards of  substantive rationality.  In fact, respect 
for individual autonomy within liberal states includes the legal protection of  irrational, ‘unwise’ 
choices.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The Frankfurt-inspired model of  autonomy might seem attractive for psychiatric practice, but 
suffers from the fact that its criterion for autonomy (reflective endorsement) does not suffice to 
exclude many cases where mental capacity and autonomy is (seen to be) compromised.  Use of  
conceptions of  autonomy which build in rationality of  either a procedural or substantive kind 
are more promising for establishing mental capacity, since these conceptions offer more 
guidance than the Frankfurt-inspired model.  Still, we have seen that they do not fit clinical and 
legal practices, since anorexic patients are not treated as autonomous even when procedurally 
rational and (substantively) irrational decisions can be protected by the law.  Thus, before either 
of  these philosophical conceptions can be utilised in the clinical or legal context, further 
refinements both within and between law, philosophy, and psychiatry will be required.x   
 One salient aspect of  contemporary philosophical debates not yet touched upon is the 
question of  the appropriate unit for autonomous choice: while in antiquity autonomy was 
predominantly used to describe city states, it now tends to be applied to individuals.  Recently, 
relational accounts of  autonomy have proposed to widen the perspective to the social context of  
choice,xi and this could also have implications for the way mental health care professionals assess 
mental capacity.  
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